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Deforestation, Production Intensity and Land Use 
Under Insecure Property Rights  
 
Abstract: 
 
We propose a framework with endogenous allocation of land between agricultural 
production, sustainable forest management, and unsustainable forest exploitation in the 
form of illegal logging to explore deforestation and agricultural and timber supplies when 
property rights are insecure. Uncertainty over property rights arises through risk of 
confiscation on sustainably-managed forest land, and through illegal logging activities on 
frontier native forest land. Confiscation risk is shown to increase deforestation by 
increasing both land conversion to agriculture and illegal logging.  Contrary to current 
wisdom, we find that higher timber prices do not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
land used for sustainable forestry, because higher prices stimulate illegal logging activity. 
Increased monitoring and stronger enforcement reduce illegal logging, and thus 
deforestation.  Confiscation risk decreases timber supply from unsustainable forestry 
practices while the affect of timber price on timber supply is ambiguous.   
 
Keywords: deforestation, property rights, stochastic rotation 
JEL classification: Q 223, Q15, K42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
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The last fifty years of research has made clear that land use plays a central role in 
deforestation. Exploitation of de facto open access native forests is known to follow rent- 
driven behavior, where land is converted into its most profitable uses. Most often tropical 
forests are converted to agriculture, which leads to permanent reductions in forest cover. 
It is worth noting that some native forests are developed into sustained plantation forests, 
which changes the type of forest present but does not entail deforestation per se (see, e.g. 
Anderson et al. 2002). Aside from land clearing, the most serious form of deforestation is 
illegal logging, either in the form of timber trespass on managed forests or unauthorized 
harvesting in native frontier forests (ITTO 2002). Illegal logging is exacerbated by an 
imperfect ability of governments to enforce land rights and policies. Gray (2000) argues 
that tropical frontier forests are illegally logged when marginal rent changes make this 
risky activity profitable.   
Land use and management of forests are subject to many types of uncertainty, but 
insecure property rights are the most visible in developing countries.  Conversion of 
native forest land to agricultural land is usually the only efficient means of securing 
private property rights to land, as open land is more easily protected. Sustainable forest 
plantations are a much more risky land use form, because forest land is not cleared and 
therefore not easily monitored.   Moreover, Deacon (1994) argues that political instability 
results in periodic confiscation of land and forests. 
Interaction of land use and insecure property rights jointly determines 
deforestation. Property right uncertainty affects both land allocated among alternative 
uses, and the production intensities chosen for a given land use. Our current 
understanding of the interaction of land use and insecure property rights is incomplete in 
many ways. Most of the land use literature abstracts from problems concerning insecure 
property rights, or it abstracts from the full set of important competing land uses.  
Notable exceptions are Mendelsohn (1994) and Armsberg (1998).  In Mendelsohn 
(1994), forests are subject to confiscation unless costly effort is employed by the owner 
to defend forests from this risk.  He shows that a probability of confiscation leads to 
reduced investment in management of forests.  He focuses, however, mainly on 
incentives for destructive land use, with the sustainable forestry use treated in an 
exogenous manner. Armsberg (1998) considers production forestry and land clearing as 
 3
potential uses across a classic von Thünen rent gradient. He provides support for 
modeling un-enforced property rights as risk of confiscation, but he does not consider 
confiscation risk explicitly.  
 Bohn and Deacon (2000) show how risk of capital confiscation reduces 
investment in sustainable uses of forest land.  Their idea is that uncertainty regarding 
forest investment can arise in any period due to risk that forest rents could be confiscated. 
Bohn and Deacon do not, however, characterize land use or consider production intensity 
between competing uses.  Parks et al. (1998) consider land use and margins between 
deforestation, agriculture and plantation forest uses.1 However, like the other papers, 
uncertainty regarding illegal logging and confiscation of sustainable forest rents are not 
addressed.   
 Our purpose in this paper is to examine competing land uses and production 
intensities for tropical developing economies when property rights are uncertain and 
affect agent’s decision making.2 We extend the existing literature in several respects. 
First, we examine all relevant land use and production intensity choices, including 
unsustainable and sustainable forest uses.  Second, we consider two forms of 
uncertainties pertaining to property rights. Uncertainty can arise through the possibility 
that forest rents can be confiscated before trees are harvested on land managed according 
to sustainable practices.  Uncertainty also arises through a risk associated with illegal 
logging on the poorest quality land (frontier native forests and idle land).  The latter is a 
case where harvesters face some probability of being detected and fined by the 
government.  Both uncertainties are important owning to the government’s inability to 
enforce property rights. Finally, we link timber supply to deforestation mechanisms.  
Within this new framework, we investigate formally how various market and 
policy parameters affect deforestation.3 We find that results depend not only on how the 
                                                 
1 Similarly, Barbier and Burgess (1997) study the socially optimal land use decisions between sustainable 
forest management and land clearing for crops. They demonstrate how amenities associated with forest 
stocks change the rent gradient in favor of less land clearing from a social perspective.  
2 It is worth noting that we focus here on a microeconomic study of deforestation, and this distinguishes our 
work from more macroeconomic studies that link deforestation to population change, changes in economy-
wide interest and exchange rates, credit availability, or trade policies.    
 
3 This has been a point of debate within the literature. For example, Angelson (1999) and Angelson and  
Kaimowitz (1999) point out that previous models provide conflicting results concerning the effects of 
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margins defining land use change, but also on how the production intensity within each 
land use changes. Most models have relied on the assumption that insecure property 
rights are captured simply through the possibility of land clearing for agriculture. 
However, we show that confiscation and illegal logging, both of which follow from 
insecure property rights, are much more complex determinants of deforestation.  Supply 
has not been linked specifically to deforestation measures, yet it could be an easily 
observable indicator.  
We demonstrate that confiscation risk increases deforestation by increasing both 
land conversion to agriculture and illegal logging. Contrary to current wisdom, higher 
timber prices do not necessarily lead to an increase in land used for sustainable forestry, 
because the profitability of illegal logging also increases. Confiscation risk decreases 
timber supply from unsustainable forestry practices, but the effect of timber price on 
timber supply is ambiguous.  These findings have important policy implications. 
Reducing confiscation risk decreases deforestation via a twin-effect of reducing land 
conversion to agriculture and decreasing illegal logging. Any effort to reduce illegal 
logging via increased monitoring or higher penalty also is important in decreasing 
deforestation through channels: directly and via land shifting to sustainable forestry under 
more secure rights.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we examine the choices 
of production intensity for each land use and characterize allocation of land among these 
uses.  In Section 3 we study the qualitative determinants of land allocation and 
production intensities.  In Section 4 we analyze the supply of agricultural products and 
supply of both sustainably- and unsustainably-harvested timber, and, finally, we offer 
some conclusions in Section 5. 
 
 
 
2.  Production intensity and land allocation in agriculture and forestry  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
tenure risk, and of timber prices in general on deforestation. Others have argued that increases in prices 
will lead to greater incentives for sustainable forest plantations (Barbier et al. 1995).   
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We now detail a model of tropical deforestation and land use by assuming three possible 
uses of existing forest land.4 Agricultural production is practiced via clearing of forest 
land and is considered to be an efficient means of securing the property rights on the 
land.5 Forest land use occurs in two forms, as sustainable and unsustainable forestry 
practices. With sustainable forestry, the landowner plants and harvests timber for long 
term rent maximization, making stand investments each time a new rotation is started. 
Tenure insecurity implies a risk that managed forest land will be confiscated before the 
landowner realizes rents during any rotation. Confiscation in the form of timber trespass 
can be total or partial.6 Unsustainable forestry practice is consistent with shorter term 
forest exploitation in the form of illegal logging. Because a land user harvests from what 
is perceived to be an exogenous stock, confiscation is not an issue.  However, whether a 
harvester is detected illegally logging, and whether the government enforces a penalty for 
this activity once detection occurs, is important to decision making. Neither is guaranteed 
in tropical countries as others have noted (ITTO 2002, Gray 2000).  
To model the distribution of land uses, we assume that existing forest land can be 
divided onto a continuum of parcels for which land quality is uniform on each parcel.  
These parcels vary in land quality. Landowners are price takers and face two types of 
decisions, first, how many parcels, should be devoted to each land use, and, second, what 
production intensity should be chosen for each parcel. The model is solved recursively 
using an approach modified from Lichtenberg (1989) and (2002), and Hardie and Parks 
(1997). Recursion means that agricultural and forestry production is first optimized over 
all parcels, and then each parcel is allocated to its most profitable use.    
 
2.1. Agricultural production  
                                                 
4 Hartwick et al. (2001) consider an intertemporal model where cycles develop as land is cleared for 
agriculture, but then is reconverted into forests sometime in the future as relative prices change.  This idea 
applies more to developed countries, as the authors suggest, and it could be a long term feature of the basic 
deforestation problem we elaborate in this paper.  
5  See e.g.  Pendleton and Howe 2002 and Angelson (1999) for recent reviews of this literature as it is 
related to smallholders. Assuming property rights governing the agricultural land use are secure is 
consistent with the observation that clearing of land is seen as a way of protecting tenure on forest land, 
because trespass is easier to observe and deter (e.g. Armsberg 1998). 
6 Generally confiscation can take many forms, as pointed out by Bohn and Deacon (2000), including          
government expropriation as well as losses of investment from non-government sources, such as timber 
trespass. 
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A landowner is assumed to employ variable agricultural inputs each period, represented 
by l , at a constant marginal cost of w . The landowner also pays a constant cost of 
conversion, denoted by ψ , whenever units of land are brought into agricultural 
production. Agricultural yield in each period is a concave function of the level of the 
variable input, i.e., );( qlf , where 0);( >qlfl , 0);( <qlfll , and higher land quality q 
increases the marginal product of the input, 0);( >qlflq .7 As is convention, we assume 
that there is no dependence between production in different periods. Using these 
assumptions, the present value of profit from agricultural production over all parcels is 
defined by,  
 
qdtewlqlfp rta ∀−−= −
∞
∫
0
));(( ψπ ,     (1) 
 
where ap  is the price of the agricultural crop and r  is the interest rate. The landowner 
optimizes agricultural production (1) by choosing the level of the input l according to the 
first order condition, 0);( =− wqlfp la , which holds at each point in time. This implicitly 
determines the optimal level of l in each time period, ),,(ˆˆ qwpll a
∗∗ = , and substituting 
this into (1) gives the indirect net present value profit function per 
parcel, ),,,,(
+−−−+
∗ qrwpa ψπ , where we have indicated the marginal effects of the exogenous 
parameters making use of the envelope theorem.  
 
 
2.2. Sustainable timber production 
 
The sustainable forestry use is characterized by the landowner engaging in long term 
forest production. The best example of this would be managing successive rotations of 
                                                 
7 In what follows, derivatives of functions with one variable will be denoted using primes, while partial 
derivatives will be denoted using subscripts indicating what variable we are differentiating with respect 
to.  
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plantations. This is the case in many developing countries, such as in Latin America, 
where private land ownership abuts frontier native forests. Long term sustainable forest 
production is most conveniently described by a Faustmann model, where the landowner 
seeks to maximize the net present value of an infinite sequence of rotations by choosing 
rotation age. Establishment of plantations requires a management cost, which reflects 
planting effort and other efforts directed toward protecting one’s investment, such as 
partial clearing around the perimeter.   
 Due to unenforceable property rights the Faustmann model must be modified to 
reflect the possibility of confiscation of forest land. Clearly, the possibility of 
confiscation represents some uncertainty that the landowner will lose rents from forest 
production during any one rotation, if confiscation occurs fully or partly before trees are 
harvested. A convenient way to capture this risk is to follow the forest fire uncertainty 
Faustmann model of Reed (1984), specifying uncertainty of confiscation as a Poisson 
process. Our approach differs from Reed (1984) in two respects. First, we will imbed 
such risk into a land use framework to assess how land use margins depend on 
uncertainty, and, second, we derive several qualitative results needed to understand the 
deforestation problem that have not been presented in this kind of rotation model.    
 Let forest yield be given by );( qTF , where T is the rotation age, and 
0);( >qTFT , 0);( >qTFq and 0);( >qTFTq .The event of confiscation is random in each 
period and is described Poisson process having parameter λ , with an average arrival rate 
of confiscation in any time period equal to λ1 . Given a rotation age of T , the 
probability that the forest is confiscated before the rotation age is reached is given by 
TeTX λ−−=< 1)Pr( , and the probability that the rotation age is reached before 
confiscation occurs is given by TeTX λ−== )Pr( .   
 We assume that the landowner is risk-neutral, which follows the existing rotation 
literature under uncertainty. The expected net present value per parcel, conditional on 
rotation ageT ,  is,  
 
}{
1
)...( 21
n
n
XXXr YeEJ n∑∞
=
+++−= ,       (2) 
 8
  
where 0=nY when confiscation occurs before the rotation age in any one rotation is 
reached, i.e., if TX n < , and ceqTFpY rTfn −= −);(  if the rotation age is reached 
without confiscation, i.e., if TX n = . The timber price net of harvesting costs is 
φ−= ff pp ˆ , where φ is the unit harvesting cost and fpˆ is the stumpage price, and c  is a 
cost of establishment once either the trees have been confiscated or the rotation age is 
reached. Our setup here means that confiscation is total when it occurs during a rotation, 
although we relax this later.  This setup presumes that confiscation applies to the trees 
and not necessarily to the land. Thus, once confiscation does occur, the landowner then 
begins another forest rotation, and this process repeats each rotation forever under risk. 
This is consistent with timber trespass on sustainably managed forest land occurring 
because the government is unable to protect forests from this type of encroachment.  
 Given that confiscation events are assumed to arrive independently over time, we 
can rewrite the objective function in (2) as, 
 
)](1[
)]);(([
rX
rT
f
rX
eE
ceqTFpeE
J −
−−
−
−= .      (3) 
 
Evaluating the expectations, using procedures similar to Reed (1984), the objective 
function J for the risk-neutral landowner over all parcels can be written in a convenient 
form as a function of confiscation risk and other parameters (see Appendix 1 for results 
that follow),  
 
q
er
eceqTFpr
J Tr
TrrT
f ∀−
−+= +−
+−−
)1(
]);()[(
)(
)(
λ
λλ
.    (4) 
 
To find the first order condition for optimal rotation age we differentiate (4) with respect 
to T , which after some simplification becomes,  
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)1(
]);()[(
),();(0 )( Tr
rT
frTrT
TfT e
ceqTFpr
eqTrFeqTFpJ λ
λ
+−
−
−−
−
−++=⇔= . (5) 
 
We assume the second order condition, 0<TTJ , holds.  Equation (5), when compared to 
the deterministic case of λ = 0, indicates that the opportunity cost of not harvesting 
increases, because the land rent component is now higher due to confiscation risk. This 
higher opportunity cost implies a shorter rotation age. Longer rotation ages increase the 
cumulative probability that confiscation will occur before the end of the rotation – thus, 
the presence of confiscation risk increases the expected cost of delaying harvest.  
 Given that the second order condition holds, we can substitute the optimal 
rotation age T implicitly defined by (5) into the objective function (4) to obtain the 
expected indirect net present value rent per parcel from sustainable forest activities. It 
depends on exogenous parameters as follows ),,,,(
+−−−+
∗∗ ≡ qrcpJJ f λ .  With the exception 
of timber price and land quality, other variables will have a negative effect on ∗J . 
The comparative statics of this type of model are not found in the literature. The 
following relationships hold between parameters and rotation age,  
 
0;0;0;0 <−=∂
∂<−=∂
∂>−=∂
∂<−=∂
∂
TT
Tq
TT
T
TT
Tc
TT
Tp
f J
J
q
T
J
JT
J
J
c
T
J
J
p
T f λ
λ .           (6) 
 
Higher timber price shortens the optimal rotation, but higher maintenance cost lengthens 
it.  Increased confiscation risk reduces rotation age, because the expected cost of 
continuing any rotation, and thus losing rents to confiscation, is higher. Moreover, the 
higher is the quality of land, the shorter is the optimal rotation period.   
 The results in (6) are derived under the assumption that confiscation is total when 
it occurs. In the case of partial confiscation, the appendix shows that the expected net 
present value of sustainable forest production is higher, and the rotation age increases as 
the degree of confiscation decreases.  Partial confiscation also does not change the 
qualitative results derived above under the assumption of total confiscation.  
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 2.3. Unsustainable timber production 
 
Illegal logging is a form of unsustainable exploitation in de facto open access forests that 
are not directly protected by enforced property rights (Clarke et al. 1993, Boscolo and 
Vincent 2000, Amacher et al. 2003).  Illegal logging can be modeled as rents captured by 
one time logging from an exogenously given stock of forests. When a harvester engages 
in this type of activity, he faces an uncertain prospect of being detected and paying a 
penalty for the illegal activity.8   
 To characterize this land use problem, we again assume risk neutrality.  The 
expected present value of profits for unsustainable logging on all parcels is given by, 
 
[ ] qdteQcQpQcQpV rtff ∀−−+−−= −∞∫
0
))(~)1(ˆ())(~ˆ)(1( τρρ ,  (7) 
 
where Q is volume of forest logged, ρ is the probability of detection by the government, 
and τ is the unit penalty assessed on revenues captured by the illegal harvester. The first 
term in (7) measures expected harvesting revenues in the absence of detection from 
illegal logging. The second term describes revenues net of the penalty when detection of 
illegal logging occurs and is enforced. The term )()()(~ QcqQc φ=  is a convex cost 
function for illegal logging. It depends positively on land quality, so that 0)(~ <′= Qccq φ . 
We can re-express the integral (7) as, 
 
 [ ] qdteQcQpV rtf ∀−−= −∞∫
0
)(~ˆ)(1( ρτ      (8) 
 
 For the risk-neutral landowner, the first order condition for unsustainable forest 
production intensity (illegal logging) over all parcels is given by, 
 
                                                 
8  Penalties are often low and detection is infrequent in developing countries, but this is simply a special 
case of the general form we introduce for unsustainable forest rent in (8). 
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0)(~)1(ˆ =′−−= QcpV fQ ρτ .       (9) 
 
This shows that harvesting will occur so that expected per parcel marginal revenue equals 
the marginal cost of venturing out into frontier areas and illegally logging. Let optimal 
illegal logging equal ),,ˆ( ρτfpQQ ≡ .  Substituting this into (8) gives the expected 
maximum rents captured by unsustainable forest harvesting: ),,,,ˆ(**
+−−−+
≡ qrpVV f ρτ . 
Higher timber price and higher quality of land will increase the expected present value 
for unsustainable harvesting, ceteris paribus, while a higher penalty rate, probability of 
detection, and higher interest rate will have the reverse effect.        
The comparative statics of illegal logging are straightforward. An increase in 
timber price will increase unsustainable logging, 0ˆ >fpQ , while a higher penalty 
decreases it, 0<τQ . The same holds true for the probability of detection, 0<ρQ . Since 
there is no dependence between periodic activities, the interest rate has no effect on 
logging for unsustainable activities.  
 
2.4 Land allocation between agriculture and forest uses 
 
We now examine how land is allocated between the three uses. To facilitate analysis, we 
start by making relevant assumptions about suitability of agriculture and the two forms of 
forestry on land of various qualities. Denote by G the potentially usable amount of forest 
land. Within G land quality differs depending on physical, chemical and biological 
factors, such as soil properties, hydrologic properties, etc. All land can be divided into 
separate parcels having uniform quality. Following Lichtenberg (1989), we rank land 
quality by the scalar measure q, with a scale chosen so that minimal land quality is zero 
and maximal land quality is equal to one, i.e., 10 ≤≤ q . With this interpretation, G(q) is 
simply defined as the cumulative distribution of q, i.e. the set of parcels having at most a 
quality level of q.  Let  g(q) be the density function for G(q), i.e, )()( qGqg ′= .  
 
The total amount of forest land is given by, 
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∫= 1
0
)( dqqgG .         (10)   
 
The land area G will be allocated to agriculture and the two forestry uses or will remain 
idle. We showed earlier that 0* >qπ , 0* >qJ  and 0* >qV , so any type of production is 
assumed to be more profitable on better land qualities. We now make the following 
assumption concerning relative profitability of land uses in terms of land quality.  
 
Assumption A: For land qualities and land uses, the following relationships hold, 
A1. *** π<< JV  for q = 1,  
A2. *** π>> JV for q = 0, and 
A3. 0* =V  for 0≥= qq , 
 
where A1 and A2 define the relative profitability of different land uses. From A1, at the 
best land quality level, agricultural production is most profitable, and sustainable timber 
production is more profitable than unsustainable illegal logging. A2 in turn indicates that 
the order is reversed on lowest quality land.  Assumptions A1 – A2 together with 0* >qπ , 
0* >qJ , and 0* >qV  ensure that agriculture performs best when practiced on the highest 
quality land, 9 and unsustainable forestry performs best when practiced on lowest quality 
land. This has been the observation in tropical countries where deforestation is studied 
(Parks et al. 1998). Finally, A3 allows for a possibility that some land will be left idle and 
not be allocated to forestry of any kind. This margin is defined by the zero profit 
condition of illegal logging (e.g., see Khanna et al. 2002 for a different application).  
Denote land area devoted to agriculture and to combined unsustainable forestry 
and idle land by aL  and imL +  respectively, so that land area devoted to sustainable 
forestry is then defined by aimf LLL −−= +1  .  Land area for unsustainable forestry mL  
                                                 
9 This could easily apply to either grazing or crop uses, as either are devoted to the highest quality land in  
tropical countries (Anderson et al. 2002).   
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becomes defined by the zero-profit condition. Land allocation in the economy can be 
obtained by solving the following problem, 
 
[ ] dqqgLLLJLVPV aaimim
imLaL
)()1(max
1
0,
∫ +−−+= ∗+∗+∗+ π .   (11) 
 
The necessary conditions for interior solutions of La and imL +  are respectively, 
 
0=−=∂
∂ ∗∗ J
L
PV
a
π ,        (12) 
0=−=∂
∂ ∗∗
+
JV
L
PV
im
        (13) 
 
The first condition (12) defines the upper intensive margin of land quality between 
agriculture and sustainable forestry uses, which we denote as 1q . The second condition 
(13) defines the lower intensive margin between sustainable and unsustainable forestry, 
which will be denoted as 2q . Finally, the zero-profit condition  
 
0=∗V          (14) 
 
defines the extensive margin between unsustainable forestry and idle unexploited land, 
denoted by q .  
 Under the assumption made above, interior solutions exist for land allocation. 
Thus, agriculture, sustainable forestry, and illegal logging will be conducted in three 
compact ranges of land qualities. Land devoted to agriculture and the two forms of 
forestry are defined using (10) and the definitions of three relevant margins as follows: 
 
)()1()( 1
1
1
qGGdqqgL
q
a −== ∫ ,       (15) 
 14
∫ −== 1
2
)()()( 21
q
q
f qGqGdqqgL , and      (16) 
)()()( 2
2
qGqGdqqgL
q
q
m −== ∫ .      (17) 
 
Land choices are illustrated in Figure 1 along with the rent curves of all land uses as a 
function of land quality. Land use is determined by the intersection of rent curves and by 
the zero-profit condition of unsustainable forest use.  The figure reflects Assumption A, 
in that the rent gradient for the agriculture use, when graphed over land qualities, is 
steeper than the rent gradient for sustainable forestry use, and the rent gradient for 
sustainable forestry use is steeper than the rent gradient for unsustainable forestry use.  
 
3. Comparative statics of land allocation 
 
Now we examine what are the impacts of exogenous parameters on land allocation.  We 
differentiate equations (15) – (17) with respect to exogenous variables, accounting for 
margins 1q , 2q , and q  given by (12) – (14).  Let the vector of exogenous variables be 
defined as a parameter θ , i.e., ],,,,,,,[ τρλθ wrcpp fa= , where φ−= ff pp ˆˆ . Using this 
notation and differentiating we obtain, 
 
θθ ∂
∂−= 11)( qqgd
dLa ,         (18) 
θθθ ∂
∂−∂
∂= 2211 )()( qqgqqgd
dL f , and      (19) 
θθθ ∂
∂−∂
∂= qqgqqg
d
dLm )()( 22 .       (20) 
 
Equations (18) – (20) allow us to go beyond current literature, where most of the 
emphasis is placed on analyzing changes in land area devoted to agriculture (land 
clearing), or on analyzing only how the extensive margin changes with exogenous 
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parameter changes. Here we concentrate on reporting overall effects of the parameters on 
the two types of forest uses. 
 
3.1 Sustainable forestry use 
 
We begin by reporting the overall effects on land area allocated to sustainable forestry. 
Equations (A2.1) and (A2.2) in Appendix 2 indicate how the upper and lower intensive 
margins behave with changes in the parameter vector θ . These results reveal that 
agricultural parameters affect only the upper intensive margin 1q , i.e., the land use 
margin between sustainable forestry and agricultural land conversion, while parameters 
specific to unsustainable forestry affect only the lower intensive margin 2q , i.e., the land 
use decision between sustainable and unsustainable forestry.   
The timber price, regeneration costs, risk of confiscation and the interest rate 
affect both upper and lower intensive margins, however. Consider first the effect of 
timber price on land devoted to sustainable forest production,  
 
?)()(
ˆ
ˆˆ
2
ˆ
1 =∆
−+=
∗∗∗
fff ppp
f
f JVqg
D
J
qg
pd
dL
,     (21) 
 
where 0][ >−= ∗∗ qq JD π  evaluated at the upper intensive margin q1, and 0<−=∆ ∗∗ qq JV  
evaluated at the lower intensive margin q2.  A higher timber price increases the present 
value of timber revenues, so that the upper intensive margin increases, ceteris paribus. At 
the lower intensive margin, the sign of the difference )( ˆˆ
∗∗ −
ff pp
JV  depends on the sign of 
the expression 
)1(
))](;([)(~ *)(
*)(
*
Tr
Tr
e
erqTFcQc λ
λλφ
+−
+−
−
++− .  The first term in this expression 
represents illegal logging costs, while the second term is a function of maintenance and 
harvest costs for sustainable forest production, as well as a function of the real interest 
rate and confiscation risk.  In our general land use model, it is therefore not guaranteed 
that higher prices will result in greater incentives to establish sustainable forest 
plantations. If illegal logging costs are higher than the costs of sustainable forest 
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production, then 0)( ˆˆ >− ∗∗ ff pp JV and the sign of 
f
f
p
L
ˆ∂
∂
is ambiguous.  If, however, the costs 
of illegal logging are lower than the costs of sustainable forestry as one would expect, 
then 0)( ˆˆ <− ∗∗ ff pp JV .  In this case, land in sustainable forestry is an increasing function of 
the price as some poorer quality land becomes relatively more profitable in sustainable 
forest use.  This is more likely at higher interest rates and higher risks of confiscation, 
ceteris paribus.10  The effect of higher establishment or management costs on land parcels 
devoted to sustainable forestry is given by the following, 
 
0)()( 21 <∆−=
∗∗
ccf Jqg
D
Jqg
dc
dL
.      (22) 
 
A higher management cost decreases land rents for ongoing forest rotations, thereby 
reducing the profitability of sustainable forest production. Land clearing for agriculture 
becomes more profitable at the upper intensive margin, and thus lower quality land is 
cleared of forests. The lower intensive margin also changes, because some sustainable 
forest land is abandoned– it then becomes part of the unsustainable forestry use. Both 
margin effects reinforce each other and land area in sustainable forestry unambiguously 
decreases. This is illustrative of a double mechanism of deforestation, and it is one reason 
why some have called for subsidies to reduce costs of sustainable forest practices such as 
reduced impact logging (Winkler et al. 1997, Barreto et al. 1998).  
 The importance of confiscation risk to sustainable and unsustainable forest land 
uses has not been formally studied. Confiscation risk might promote illegal logging and 
reduce incentives to engage in sustainable forestry practices. Indeed, our land use model 
shows this to be the case. The effect of confiscation risk on land devoted to sustainable 
forest production is given by,  
                                                 
10 This follows from defining (.)][ FcX φ+= , and examining how the sustainable forestry cost term 
depends on the interest rate, i.e.,  
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λ λλ .  Making 
use of a second order approximation for the term )1( )( Tre λ+−− (see Appendix 1) shows that the 
derivative is negative.  A higher risk of confiscation has a similar effect.    
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Increases in confiscation risk decrease the expected profitability of sustainable forestry 
relative to both agriculture and unsustainable forest practices, i.e. both the upper intensive 
and lower intensive margins move toward each other, and land devoted to sustainable 
forestry decreases.  
 An important policy parameter in developing economies is the interest rate. The 
effect of a real interest rate on land devoted to sustainable forestry is given by, 
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Clearly, the fact that the interest rate affects both sustainable and unsustainable forest 
uses in qualitatively similar ways means that its effect on the different margins is unclear.   
 Finally, parameters affecting agricultural production are important to 
understanding determinants of deforestation, as subsidies for land conversion are known 
to encourage land clearing of native forests (see e.g. Angelson and Kaimowitz 1999). A 
summary of our results related to this are as follows, 
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Interpretations are straightforward. Higher prices and costs in agriculture affect only the 
upper intensive margin. A higher price (clearing and input cost) increases (decreases) 
profitability of agriculture relative to forestry, and thus the upper intensive margin shifts 
to lower (higher) land qualities. The result of this is a corresponding change in forest land 
area devoted to sustainable forestry. We find something new, namely that while 
agricultural supports reduce land allocated to sustainable forestry, they have no effect on 
 18
the extensive margin and therefore do not affect the amount of land exploited for 
unsustainable forestry uses such as illegal logging. 
 
3.2. Unsustainable forestry use 
 
Turning to the question of how various parameters affect land area allocated to 
unsustainable forestry use, we find that the effects of important parameters are given by,  
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As for the effect of timber price, we have a similar situation as we did before with 
sustainable forest land area.  That is, the sign of (26) depends on the difference in cost 
structures between sustainable forest management and illegal logging in the first term, 
which governs the effect of prices on the lower intensive margin q2. The second RHS 
term is the effect of price on the extensive margin realized through changes in the 
profitability of illegal logging – this is a positive function of the price. If costs of illegal 
logging are higher than the costs of sustainable forest production, then the area subject to 
illegal logging is an unambiguously increasing function of the price given that 
0)( ˆˆ >− ∗∗ ff pp JV  in (26).  
 According to (27), a higher probability of detection, or a higher enforced fine for 
illegal logging, will decrease the profitability of unsustainable activities. This implies 
governments must find ways to enforce illegal logging and collect stiff fines for such 
behavior, if the goal is to reduce area subjected to this use. Doing so decreases profit 
from illegal logging, thereby shifting the external margin on better land qualities and 
reducing deforestation.  
 
4. Agricultural and timber supplies 
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One advantage of our land use model is that we can determine how timber and 
agricultural supplies shift in an economy, as either margins between different land uses 
shift or production intensities change in response to exogenous paramters. The supply 
effects of market parameters are rarely discussed in the literature, and supply has not 
been linked specifically to deforestation mechanisms. This merits investigation, because 
timber supply is an observable indicator of production and thus a potential target for 
policies.  
The earlier results concerning margins indicate how land area responds to changes 
in the parameter vector θ . Supply effects of θ  are equivalent to changes in production 
intensity and land area devoted to each forest use.  Prior to examining these effects, we 
must first define a per parcel supply function for each practice and an aggregate supply 
function over all parcels devoted to each practice. We will do this for one point in time, 
but the analysis holds over time as long as parameters remain constant.  
 
4.1. Timber supply from sustainable forestry 
 
Denote the supply of wood from sustainable forestry land as fS . Because the sustainable 
forestry segment of our model follows the common rotations-based approach, we employ 
the conventional definition of annual average supply for these models (e.g, Clark 1976, 
pp. 262-263, Conrad 1999, pp. 68-70). Average annual timber supply per parcel is 
defined by 
 
∗
∗
≡≡
T
qTFqTQQ
ff
);();( *** .       (28) 
Aggregate average annual timber supply is then given by, 
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It is now straightforward to investigate how various parameters change the supply 
function in (29) by totally differentiating with respect to parameters in θ ,11 
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The most interesting, and indeed the only clear result, concerns the impact on sustainable 
timber supply of confiscation risk (equation 33). Higher confiscation risk unambiguously 
reduces timber supply from sustainable forestry. This arises through two channels: a) 
changes in margins (upper intensive and lower intensive) that decrease total land area in 
sustainable forestry via the second and third RHS terms; and b) production intensity 
decreases on all parcels devoted to sustainable forestry as risk of confiscation increases. 
Thus, timber supply decreases unambiguously, and deforestation increases because of 
illegal logging and agricultural land clearing.  
 The effects of other parameters on timber supply from the sustainable forest 
practice are not as clear. From equation (30), a higher timber price induces expansion of 
sustainable forest use to higher quality parcels currently devoted to agriculture, but its 
effect on the lower intensive margin remains ambiguous. Moreover, higher timber price 
                                                 
11 The first terms in (30) – (33) measure the change in timber production intensity from a parameter change, 
i.e. these measure rotation age changes. For any exogenous parameter θ, a change in average annual timber 
supply is given by ]);([
T
qTFF
T
T −′θ , where the bracketed term is positive for all r ≥ 0.  Thus the rotation age 
effect determines the sign of annual average timber supply.   
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shortens rotation age, which decreases the average annual timber supply per parcel 
according to (28). Thus, the overall effect of price is ambiguous.  
Ambiguity also surrounds the effect of the management cost parameter, c, on 
supplies.  This lengthens rotation age and increases timber supply. However, because 
higher forest management costs shift land toward agriculture and toward illegal logging, 
the overall affect of c on timber supply from sustainable managed land is unknown. 
Finally, as for the effect of the interest rate, both the margins and the rotation age change 
in response to this parameter, but in different directions. Thus, it is not clear how 
economy-wide interest rate changes affect supply from sustainable forests.  
 Any parameter that changes illegal logging will in principle also cause changes in 
timber supplies from sustainable forest land, via changes in the lower intensive margin. 
The effects of illegal logging parameters on sustainable timber supply are, 
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A higher penalty rate or probability of detection will increase timber supply from 
sustainable forests, due to increased land area devoted to sustainable forest production. 
This underscores again the need for developing countries to seriously enforce and protect 
forests from illegal logging if the goal is development of an economy based on supplies 
from sustainable uses of forest land.   
Finally, for the effects of agricultural parameters on supply from the sustainable 
forest use, we can show that agricultural price increases will decrease timber supply, but 
increases in costs of either conversion or the agricultural input increase it. This again 
establishes a connection between policies that target agricultural costs and prices, and the 
land area subject to deforestation.  
 
4.2. Timber supply from unsustainable forestry  
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Denote timber supply generated from (illegal) unsustainable exploitation of forests by mS . 
The supply function for this use is defined as, 
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where )(* qQm denotes the optimum value of Q defined implicitly by (9).  Differentiating 
(36) with respect to timber price, penalty rate and probability of detection gives,  
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A higher probability of detection or a higher penalty, both of which decrease expected 
rents from illegal logging, reduce supply from unsustainable forest use through 
corresponding changes in harvest intensity and land use.  It has been suggested in the 
literature that timber price increases could provide a strong incentive for sustainable 
forest practice, but again we find that timber price is ambiguous and depends, as in (21), 
on the relative cost difference between illegal logging and sustainable forest 
management.  This cost difference determines the effect of price on the lower intensive 
margin (second term in 37).  If the costs of illegal logging are higher than costs of 
sustainable forest management, then we find a provocative result here, that supply from 
unsustainable illegal logging is increasing in the timber price.  This follows from 
equation (37), where a higher price would work to increase supply from unsustainable 
logging through greater production intensity (first term), a higher lower intensive margin 
(second term), and a lower extensive margin (last term).   
 23
The timber price effect is particularly interesting, because it confirms the idea that 
price-induced timber supply increases can work in the direction of increased harvest 
intensity and supply from unsustainable activities. This more general way of thinking 
follows in our model, because unsustainable logging competes with sustainable logging 
for land parcels.  
 In terms of comparative statics, we have some additional findings,  
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Interestingly, higher costs of establishing sustainable forests or higher risk of confiscation 
for these forests increase supply from unsustainable forest use. This is consistent with the 
results we found earlier and they suggest, again, that policies or changes in parameters 
that affect sustainable forestry rents will spill over onto unsustainable forestry practices.  
 
4.3. Agricultural supply  
 
We close by briefly considering production intensity and supply from agricultural land 
use. Supply here is simply the sum of per parcel output supply for the area of land 
allocated to agriculture as follows: 
∫= 1 *
1
)()(
q
a dqqgqfS .        (41) 
In (41), )(* qf refers to the optimum level of agricultural production in any period when 
the agricultural input is employed at its optimal level, i.e., ));,,(ˆ()( ** qqwplfqf a≡  (see 
section 2.1). Differentiating (41) with respect to parameters characterizing sustainable 
forestry gives, 
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Agricultural supply decreases (increases) as timber price (management cost) increases via 
changes in land allocation and production intensities. Higher confiscation risk increases 
land conversion to agriculture, given that this use is more secure. Higher timber price 
reduces agricultural supply as more land is shifted toward sustainable forest production 
through changes in the upper intensive margin.  Finally, a higher interest rate decreases 
supply from agricultural uses, but its affect on the upper intensive margin is ambiguous 
given that interest rate changes also negatively affect the profitability of sustainable 
forestry.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We developed a general model of all relevant land uses to analyze tropical deforestation 
in the presence of insecure property rights. We examined land use, production intensity, 
and supply by formalizing the margins between agricultural production (land clearing), 
sustainable forest management, and unsustainable forest exploitation in the form of 
illegal logging on frontier areas. Our analysis extends existing literature in many ways. 
First, we address all relevant land use alternatives, including both unsustainable and 
sustainable forest uses.  Second, we introduce two important types of uncertainties 
surrounding property rights, which can differ across the forestry uses, and we link these 
uncertainties specifically to mechanisms of deforestation. Uncertainty arises through the 
possibility that forest rents can be confiscated before trees are harvested on land managed 
according to sustainable practices, and through a risk associated with illegal logging on 
the poorest quality land.  The latter is a case where harvesters face some probability of 
being detected and fined by the government. Third, we link timber supply to 
deforestation mechanisms.  
We examine the effects on land use and production intensity decisions of several 
important policy and market parameters, and in doing so uncover several new 
conclusions about the mechanisms of deforestation. Confiscation risk has serious effects 
on deforestation, through both land conversion to agriculture and through changes in the 
profitability of illegal logging relative to sustainable forest production.  This risk also 
 25
serves to reduce supplies from sustainable managed forests through changes in land use 
and through production intensity changes. The importance of higher timber prices to 
deforestation is much more complex than previous work suggests.  Price effects depend 
on several important and measurable parameters such as interest rates, the difference in 
cost structure between illegal harvesting and the maintenance and harvesting of 
sustainable forests, and the magnitude of confiscation risk. Indeed, inclusion of the 
potential for illegal logging means that higher timber prices do not always lead to greater 
incentives for sustainable forest production.  Rather, higher timber price could involve a 
shift of some sustainably-managed forest land to unsustainable logging and increase the 
illegal component of timber supply.      
These new results and our extension to supply effects lead to several important 
policy conclusions. Clearly, anything a government can do to reduce the uncertainties 
will reduce deforestation. Reduction of confiscation risk works to reduce deforestation 
through a twin effect of reducing land conversion to agriculture and reducing incentives 
for illegal logging. As confiscation risk increases, supply from sustainable forest use 
decreases and supply from illegal logging increases. Working to increase monitoring of 
harvesting activities or committing to higher penalties for illegal logging will always 
reduce it, both directly and indirectly via reducing the expected profitability of illegal 
logging and shifting land toward sustainable forestry uses. Given our timber price 
findings, control of this parameter has unknown and often unintended consequences, both 
with respect to forest land use and timber supply. Governments would be wise to have 
good knowledge of the cost differences between sustainable and unsustainable practices 
before moving forward with reforms directed at prices.  Finally, our complete land use 
model also shows that anything increasing the rents to agriculture serves to shift the 
margin of agricultural land toward poorer quality levels, displacing sustainable forest 
management.  Thus, incentives for land clearing are not the only activities that poorly-
chosen agricultural subsidies encourage.  
 An interesting extension of the model would be to include the possibility of 
amenities on forest land of the two types in a social planner’s problem, who must choose 
the optimal allocation of land in the different uses. Although amenities have been studied 
for native forests subject to exploitation in simpler models, it is worth nothing that 
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amenities would become stochastic in our model owning to the fact that risk of 
confiscation or detection of illegal logging are present on sustainable and unsustainable 
forest land respectively.  Possible starting points for this type of problem include models 
by Reed (1993) and Reed and Ye (1994).  
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Figure 1. Land allocation as a function of land quality 
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APPENDIX 1: Optimal rotation with confiscation probability 
 
A. Full confiscation 
 
Denote nxx ,...,1  as the times between successive confiscations of the stand. If the 
decision is to cut the stand whenever it reaches age, then the distribution of 
random variable explaining confiscation risk is tet λ−−=Γ 1)(  for Tt <  and 
1)( =Γ t  for Tt ≥ . Assuming that confiscation, when it occurs, is total, we can 
write the expected net present value of forests in sustainable production as 
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where 0=nY if Txn <  and ceqTFpY rTfn −= −);(  if .Txn =  Using the 
properties of Poisson process (A1.1) can be expressed as 
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Using tedttd λλ −=Γ /)(  we can then obtain the following expectations   
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Substituting to RHSs of (A1.3) for )( rxeE − and  )(1 rxeE −− in equation (A1.2) 
yields 
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Writing now F  for );( qTF to simplify notation, the first-order condition for the 
optimal rotation age is, 
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We assume that the second order condition holds, i.e. 
 [ ] [ ]
[ ] 0)()()(
)()()()1(
)(
)(
<+++−
++−−−−−=
−+−−
−−−+−
rT
f
TrrT
Tf
rT
f
rT
Tf
rT
TTTf
Tr
TT
FerprererFFp
FeprerFFrperFFpeJ
λλ
λ
λ
λ
(A1.6) 
 31
  
Comparative statics 
 
Using the implicit function theorem, the effect of any parameter γ  on the optimal 
rotation age is written in general form as γγ TTT JJT
1)( −−= , so that  
γγ TJsignTsign = . Now we can determine the effects of 
regeneration/maintenance cost and stumpage price as follows 
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In terms of the land quality parameter q we have, 
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The sign of (A1.9) holds because qTq FF < . Finally, for the probability of 
confiscation λ we obtain 
 [ ] [ ]cFeperFFpTeJ rTfrTTfTrT −−−= −−+− )()( λλ                                     
 
Using the first-order condition (A1.5) makes it possible to express the above 
expression as, 
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The second-order approximation for the term [ ] 122)( ))(2/1()(1 −+− ++++≈ TrTre Tr λλλ  implies  
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Finally, differentiating (A1.5) with respect to r  gives 
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Denoting Tre )(1 λ+−−=∆ and 0)( >−= −rTTf erFFpH  we can re-express the 
first-order condition (A1.5) as [ ]cFeprH rTf −+=∆ −)( λ  so that (A1.10) can be 
written as 
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Now proceeding as before and using a second-order approximation for the term  
Tre )( λ+−  we have 0)1()( >+
∆−∆−+
λ
λ
r
rT , while .0)( <+−∆ λrT Hence, if c  is 
small enough, then .00 <⇒< rTr TJ  
 
Properties of the indirect expected net present value function  
 
Substituting the optimal rotation age, ),,,ˆ,(* rqpcTT f λ= , for T  in (A1.4) gives 
the indirect expected net present value function presented in the text, 
),,,ˆ,(* rqpcJ f λ . Using the envelope theorem (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995, 
pp.964-966) we then have, (where we will write T for the optimal level of rotation 
age *T  in what follows), 
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 ,  due to 0>qF .              (A1.13) 
Differentiating the indirect net present value function with respect to λ  gives, after 
some rearranging, 
 [ ] ( )TrTrrTfTrTr reTrercFepeerJ )()()(2)(* 1()()1()()1( λλλλλ λ +−+−−+−−+− ++−−−−=   (A.1.14) 
 
The second-order approximation [ ] 122)( ))(2/1()(1 −+− ++++≈ TrTre Tr λλλ  gives 
0)1()()1( )()( <++−− +−+− TrTr reTrer λλ λ , so that .0* <λJ  Finally, differentiating 
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the indirect net present value function with respect to r  and using the second-order 
approximation for Tre )( λ+−  yields, 
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B.Partial  confiscation 
 
If confiscation is partial, then the term nY  in the expected net present value of 
forests in sustainable production (A1.1) can be written as,  
 



=−
<= −
−
TxifceqTFp
TxifeqTFkp
Y
n
rT
f
n
rT
f
n
);(
);(
              (A1.16) 
 
where 10 << k  is the proportion of non-confiscation. Using a similar procedure as 
earlier, we can write the expected net present value of forests in sustainable production in 
the presence of partial confiscation as   
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where J  has been written in (A1.4). The first-order condition for the optimal 
rotation age is now,  
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where TJ  has been written in (A1.5). Assuming that the second-order condition 
holds and using the implicit function theorem we obtain 0)( 1 >−= − TkTTk JJT
))
, 
where  
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Substituting the optimal rotation age, ),,,,,(* krqpcTT f λ= , for T  in (A1.17) 
gives the indirect expected net present value function ),,,,,(* krqpcJ f λ) . Using 
the envelope theorem we obtain,   
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APPENDIX 2. Comparative Statics of Land Allocation 
 
The effect of exogenous variables emerges via the changes of upper and lower 
intensive margin and via changes in the external margin. In this appendix we solve 
for expressions of how the margins change for a change in the general parameter 
vectorθ  defined in the text, i.e., θ∂
∂ 1q , θ∂
∂ 2q  and θ∂
∂q  for the upper intensive, lower 
intensive, and extensive margins, respectively. 
 
A. Upper intensive margin ( θ∂
∂ 1q ).  
Totally differentiating condition (12) defining the margin, 0=− ∗∗ Jπ , we obtain  
0)()(ˆ 1ˆ =−+−+−−−++ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ dqJdrJdwddpdJdcJpdJ qqrrwapcfp af πππψππλ ψλ  
 
Defining 0)(
11
>−= ∗∗ qq JD π  , evaluated at the upper intensive margin, we then have, 
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B. Lower intensive margin ( θ∂
∂ 2q  ) 
 
Totally differentiating condition (13) and defining the margin, 0=− ∗∗ JV , yields 
  
0)()(ˆ)( 1ˆˆ =−+−+−++−−− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ dqJVdrJVdwdVdVdJdcJpdJV qqrrwcfpp ff πρτλ ρτλ . 
 
Denoting 0)( <∆=− ∗∗ qq JV , evaluated at the lower intensive margin, we obtain 
the following results, 
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C.  Extensive margin ( θ∂
∂q ) 
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Differentiating totally the condition (14) defining this margin, 0=∗V , yields 
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D. Unsustainable forestry land allocation 
 
The effects of parameters on land devoted to unsustainable forest practice are 
given by, 
0)( 2 >∆=
∗
cm Jqg
dc
dL
;  0)( 2 >∆=
∗
λ
λ
Jqg
d
dLm ; ?)( 2 =∆
−−=
∗∗
rrm JVqg
dr
dL
              (A2.4) 
 
E. Agricultural supply 
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